Methodology
Before even delving into conspiracy theories it is important to begin with the methodology by which we judge them and their claims. What follows is a monologue regarding the scientific method and two principles by which we judge claims to have truth value.
It is important first off that we understand the process of investigation. In general the entire process begins with a curious observation. Then we have the steps by which we can finally come to a conclusion based on the available evidence. First off the curious observation: something piques are curiosity, whether it be noticing that the rise in vaccination rates also correlates with a rise in autism, or when Alexander Fleming noticed that there was no bacteria near the mold in his petri dishes. This triggers the innate curiosity in all of us, we simply want to know things.
After the observation we begin to form a hypothesis. Herein lies our first problem: "hypothesis" itself, does not mean blind guess. A proper hypothesis is a possible explanation that is testable. As befitting our example with the little kid and the cell phone (from the last post), claiming that elves operate the cell phone is testable, we can just break the phone open, no elves thus the hypothesis is failed. Now that gets into a different problem: there are no elves in the phone because there are no elves anywhere. They don't exist, but that doesn't mean they couldn't exist, there's no logical contradiction involved in the existence of elves. Once tested, we need to discard the elven hypothesis. In a Sherlock Holmes like assertion, "if the facts don't fit the hypothesis, we toss the hypothesis not the facts." By claiming that the elves are invisible we've negated the hypothesis, it is not testable. It is important to keep in mind that an idea which is not testable is NOT a hypothesis.
Our testing can come about through two methods: observation/experiment or research. The first requires us to run various experiments in order to either prove or disprove the hypothesis. Even finding out our hypothesis was wrong still contributes to our intellectual development--provided we are honest about the results, i.e. we cannot just keep the elves because it makes us happier. The second is research, standing on the shoulders of those who came before us. Taking the already infinitely available world of knowledge and applying it to our new problem.
In the case of the vaccinations we might research into the definition of autism, and notice that between the DSM III and IV the definition changed. Autism was now placed on a spectrum which included those with mild Asperger's all of the way to severe cases. This change in definition coincides with an uptick in vaccination rates. The research would show that it's not that austism has increased but the definition widened so the oft-cited 1:33 rate the anti-vaccination crowd uses doesn't reflect the evidence. Our hypothesis should be that vaccination is not giving rise to a generation of autism, but rather a change in definition is giving us increased diagnosis of the condition.
Evidence established, we now have a theory. In the common parlance, we use "theory" to mean "guess." I have a theory that I left my walled in my bag, or that my theory is that the Bills won't make the playoffs. However, this is incorrect, if a hypothesis is an idea that can be tested, a theory is a hypothesis that is confirmed by experimentation. The theory of evolution is confirmed by evidence, the theory of gravity is confirmed by evidence, etc. Theory doesn't mean "fact" because there is always the possibility that something may change, but it is closer to "fact" than it is to "guess" by a wide margin. In fact, this distinction between the common usage and professional usage has been exploited by organizations such as the "Discovery Institute" in order to propagate Intelligent Design (ID) with the claim that Evolution is "just a theory." Of course, it's just a theory, in the same way that plate tectonics is just a theory.
In order to arrive at a theory we have to use one of two competing theories, though the first one is not as popular anymore. This is the Verification Principle. Before we begin on this it is important to note that verification is about possibility not actualization. The simple question that we must ask under this principle is: can the idea be verified? Not whether it will be verified, but whether or not it is possible. The great champion of verificationism are two icons of linguistic philosophy (among other disciplines): Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell. Both men have had a huge impact on linguistics, logic, and philosophy in general. Our focus though is on their championing of the verification principle, which again this not being a philosophy course we do not need to focus on the argument they set forth. Interested readers can find Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
The typical example is to postulate the idea "all ravens are black." Is this idea testable? We could do a few things that allow us a path toward verification. The first is to round up all the ravens, check their color and make a determination. We could analyze their DNA, if we find the relevant genes that make the feathers black, then we have another method of determination. However, there are albino ravens. Does this mean that the idea is wrong? Yes, but it still falls under the verification principle because it tells us that the initial idea had the possibility of verification.
On the other hand, if I say the greatest movie ever made is "Big Trouble in Little China," we have to apply the verification principle to that as well. Can it be verified? No. It is an opinion (a true opinion) that cannot be verified. Thus it has no scientific value despite being absolutely right.
The problem with the verification principle is the problem of self-reference. Is the verification principle itself verifiable? That leads us to a rather problematic issue: in order to verify it we would have to look at all ideas past and future. This doesn't seem a plausible method. In mathematics there is the "set of all sets" problem in which we would have to ask, "does the set of all possible sets include itself?" Similarly can this principle refer back to itself and still hold meaning? It's unclear, but it's a philosophical issue with it.
That leads us to Austrian Philosopher Karl Popper, who was once threatened with a fire poker by Wittgenstein (allegedly). Popper is somewhat famous for his book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" in which he attacks the teleological political ideas of Plato, Hegel, and Marx as fostering a fixed course for society that will end in totalitarianism (it's rather obvious in Plato's Republic). However, for our purposes, Popper championed the criterion of falsifiability. This principle takes the opposite approach.
"All ravens are black" is scientific if it were possible that the idea could be established as being false. The albino raven falsifies the statement and thus we know the original statement is scientific in nature. Applied elsewhere, the theory of evolution is falsifiable because we can imagine the possibility of finding an animal that is thriving in an environment that it is wholly unsuited for, i.e. snakes in Antarctica. Again, it's not whether the principle has been falsified (or verified) but whether it could be. The assertion of ID, is not falisifiable nor is it verifiable since it relies on mystical claims that are outside the realm of observable knowledge.
The final position we must address is that of the burden of proof. In making a claim, the burden relies on that person making the assertion, not on the audience. If someone, in arguing a claim tells their audience that they need to "do their own research" they are shifting the burden of proof. We must consider every argument to be like that of a court room, where the burden of proof is on the prosecution not the defense. We do not have to prove our innocence only defend against accusations of our guilt. This is a strategy used by conspiracists all over the internet, to just say "well look it up yourself and you'll see." No, convince me and I'll buy it, but until that point I must regard your position with skepticism.
The claim here also comes to us from Bertrand Russell, and is known as "Russell's teapot." He writes, in an article for Illustrated Magazine in 1952, that if he were to claim that there was a teapot orbiting the sun between Earth and Mars, and that the teapot were to small to be observed by any telescope it, no body would be able to disprove its existence. Further that since the teapot cannot be disproved, it's intolerable that anyone should doubt it. The point Russell is making, is that it is absurd to admit that the teapot exists, and even more absurd to say that it is unreasonable to doubt it as the person making the teapot claim has not offered any proof other than personal testimony. Now the whole argument he makes feeds into a larger argument about religious belief, but we need not address it here as it's not salient to this post. Nevertheless, the important takeaway point is that the burden of proof always rests on those making the teapot claim, not on those of us skeptical of it.
If we are arguing against a claim, we must also put forth our own evidence. As shown earlier with the vaccination-autism claim, but this is in refuting the evidence brought forth. The imperative to "do your own research" is a rhetorical trick based on a gamble. The other person does not assume you will, and thinks that will end the conversation. The teapot refutation merely shows that they need to meet their burden and that a lack of evidence against is not evidence for.
With these three philosophical principles, as well as the scientific method; going forward we can show that conspiracy theories fail on at least one of the counts, but usually more. We will revisit evidence standards, and rhetoric in the future but for now we are armed enough to prima facie consider remarkable theories as they are presented.
It is important first off that we understand the process of investigation. In general the entire process begins with a curious observation. Then we have the steps by which we can finally come to a conclusion based on the available evidence. First off the curious observation: something piques are curiosity, whether it be noticing that the rise in vaccination rates also correlates with a rise in autism, or when Alexander Fleming noticed that there was no bacteria near the mold in his petri dishes. This triggers the innate curiosity in all of us, we simply want to know things.
After the observation we begin to form a hypothesis. Herein lies our first problem: "hypothesis" itself, does not mean blind guess. A proper hypothesis is a possible explanation that is testable. As befitting our example with the little kid and the cell phone (from the last post), claiming that elves operate the cell phone is testable, we can just break the phone open, no elves thus the hypothesis is failed. Now that gets into a different problem: there are no elves in the phone because there are no elves anywhere. They don't exist, but that doesn't mean they couldn't exist, there's no logical contradiction involved in the existence of elves. Once tested, we need to discard the elven hypothesis. In a Sherlock Holmes like assertion, "if the facts don't fit the hypothesis, we toss the hypothesis not the facts." By claiming that the elves are invisible we've negated the hypothesis, it is not testable. It is important to keep in mind that an idea which is not testable is NOT a hypothesis.
Our testing can come about through two methods: observation/experiment or research. The first requires us to run various experiments in order to either prove or disprove the hypothesis. Even finding out our hypothesis was wrong still contributes to our intellectual development--provided we are honest about the results, i.e. we cannot just keep the elves because it makes us happier. The second is research, standing on the shoulders of those who came before us. Taking the already infinitely available world of knowledge and applying it to our new problem.
In the case of the vaccinations we might research into the definition of autism, and notice that between the DSM III and IV the definition changed. Autism was now placed on a spectrum which included those with mild Asperger's all of the way to severe cases. This change in definition coincides with an uptick in vaccination rates. The research would show that it's not that austism has increased but the definition widened so the oft-cited 1:33 rate the anti-vaccination crowd uses doesn't reflect the evidence. Our hypothesis should be that vaccination is not giving rise to a generation of autism, but rather a change in definition is giving us increased diagnosis of the condition.
Evidence established, we now have a theory. In the common parlance, we use "theory" to mean "guess." I have a theory that I left my walled in my bag, or that my theory is that the Bills won't make the playoffs. However, this is incorrect, if a hypothesis is an idea that can be tested, a theory is a hypothesis that is confirmed by experimentation. The theory of evolution is confirmed by evidence, the theory of gravity is confirmed by evidence, etc. Theory doesn't mean "fact" because there is always the possibility that something may change, but it is closer to "fact" than it is to "guess" by a wide margin. In fact, this distinction between the common usage and professional usage has been exploited by organizations such as the "Discovery Institute" in order to propagate Intelligent Design (ID) with the claim that Evolution is "just a theory." Of course, it's just a theory, in the same way that plate tectonics is just a theory.
In order to arrive at a theory we have to use one of two competing theories, though the first one is not as popular anymore. This is the Verification Principle. Before we begin on this it is important to note that verification is about possibility not actualization. The simple question that we must ask under this principle is: can the idea be verified? Not whether it will be verified, but whether or not it is possible. The great champion of verificationism are two icons of linguistic philosophy (among other disciplines): Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell. Both men have had a huge impact on linguistics, logic, and philosophy in general. Our focus though is on their championing of the verification principle, which again this not being a philosophy course we do not need to focus on the argument they set forth. Interested readers can find Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
The typical example is to postulate the idea "all ravens are black." Is this idea testable? We could do a few things that allow us a path toward verification. The first is to round up all the ravens, check their color and make a determination. We could analyze their DNA, if we find the relevant genes that make the feathers black, then we have another method of determination. However, there are albino ravens. Does this mean that the idea is wrong? Yes, but it still falls under the verification principle because it tells us that the initial idea had the possibility of verification.
On the other hand, if I say the greatest movie ever made is "Big Trouble in Little China," we have to apply the verification principle to that as well. Can it be verified? No. It is an opinion (a true opinion) that cannot be verified. Thus it has no scientific value despite being absolutely right.
The problem with the verification principle is the problem of self-reference. Is the verification principle itself verifiable? That leads us to a rather problematic issue: in order to verify it we would have to look at all ideas past and future. This doesn't seem a plausible method. In mathematics there is the "set of all sets" problem in which we would have to ask, "does the set of all possible sets include itself?" Similarly can this principle refer back to itself and still hold meaning? It's unclear, but it's a philosophical issue with it.
That leads us to Austrian Philosopher Karl Popper, who was once threatened with a fire poker by Wittgenstein (allegedly). Popper is somewhat famous for his book "The Open Society and Its Enemies" in which he attacks the teleological political ideas of Plato, Hegel, and Marx as fostering a fixed course for society that will end in totalitarianism (it's rather obvious in Plato's Republic). However, for our purposes, Popper championed the criterion of falsifiability. This principle takes the opposite approach.
"All ravens are black" is scientific if it were possible that the idea could be established as being false. The albino raven falsifies the statement and thus we know the original statement is scientific in nature. Applied elsewhere, the theory of evolution is falsifiable because we can imagine the possibility of finding an animal that is thriving in an environment that it is wholly unsuited for, i.e. snakes in Antarctica. Again, it's not whether the principle has been falsified (or verified) but whether it could be. The assertion of ID, is not falisifiable nor is it verifiable since it relies on mystical claims that are outside the realm of observable knowledge.
The final position we must address is that of the burden of proof. In making a claim, the burden relies on that person making the assertion, not on the audience. If someone, in arguing a claim tells their audience that they need to "do their own research" they are shifting the burden of proof. We must consider every argument to be like that of a court room, where the burden of proof is on the prosecution not the defense. We do not have to prove our innocence only defend against accusations of our guilt. This is a strategy used by conspiracists all over the internet, to just say "well look it up yourself and you'll see." No, convince me and I'll buy it, but until that point I must regard your position with skepticism.
The claim here also comes to us from Bertrand Russell, and is known as "Russell's teapot." He writes, in an article for Illustrated Magazine in 1952, that if he were to claim that there was a teapot orbiting the sun between Earth and Mars, and that the teapot were to small to be observed by any telescope it, no body would be able to disprove its existence. Further that since the teapot cannot be disproved, it's intolerable that anyone should doubt it. The point Russell is making, is that it is absurd to admit that the teapot exists, and even more absurd to say that it is unreasonable to doubt it as the person making the teapot claim has not offered any proof other than personal testimony. Now the whole argument he makes feeds into a larger argument about religious belief, but we need not address it here as it's not salient to this post. Nevertheless, the important takeaway point is that the burden of proof always rests on those making the teapot claim, not on those of us skeptical of it.
If we are arguing against a claim, we must also put forth our own evidence. As shown earlier with the vaccination-autism claim, but this is in refuting the evidence brought forth. The imperative to "do your own research" is a rhetorical trick based on a gamble. The other person does not assume you will, and thinks that will end the conversation. The teapot refutation merely shows that they need to meet their burden and that a lack of evidence against is not evidence for.
With these three philosophical principles, as well as the scientific method; going forward we can show that conspiracy theories fail on at least one of the counts, but usually more. We will revisit evidence standards, and rhetoric in the future but for now we are armed enough to prima facie consider remarkable theories as they are presented.
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