Conspiracy Theories, Skepticism, and Critical Thinking

Last post we discussed what is known as the "Generalist position" regarding the confrontation with conspiracy theories. The generalist position holds the view that we ought to disengage with any theory that can be labelled as a "conspiracy theory." I concluded that this position is untenable for a couple of reasons: the first being that it is intellectually lazy, stereotypes theories (and by extension theorists), and what is likely the most important objection: that it can dismiss legitimate explanations of events that would likely be labelled as a conspiracy before enough evidence was discovered (the paradigmatic cases of this position are the Watergate break in and the Oliver North Iran Contra affair). The opposing position is that of "Particularism." It is, in nearly every sense, the converse of generalism. This position holds that each claim be taken on a case by case basis. Amongst the philosophical papers on the subject, particularism seems to be t

Generalism as it pertains to a position regarding the philosophical attitude toward conspiracy theories is the idea that any explanation which makes a reference to or could be pushed underneath an umbrella of the label "conspiracy theory" should be regarded with suspicion. This means that person X while trying to explain position Y, says that Y is a conspiracy theory we should mentally begin dismissing the listener's assertion. This is a tempting position to take, especially among people who consider themselves skeptics (like this author for instance). When someone seeks to explain a current/historical event and uses key words like "they," "secret group," or "I'm just asking the questions;" the tendency is to begin preparing a debunking argument. This generalist position has some advantages to it. The first is that because "conspiracy theories" have certain qualities that can be identified, it helps to be able to save time by