The Particularist Position

Last post we discussed what is known as the "Generalist position" regarding the confrontation with conspiracy theories. The generalist position holds the view that we ought to disengage with any theory that can be labelled as a "conspiracy theory." I concluded that this position is untenable for a couple of reasons: the first being that it is intellectually lazy, stereotypes theories (and by extension theorists), and what is likely the most important objection: that it can dismiss legitimate explanations of events that would likely be labelled as a conspiracy before enough evidence was discovered (the paradigmatic cases of this position are the Watergate break in and the Oliver North Iran Contra affair).

The opposing position is that of "Particularism." It is, in nearly every sense, the converse of generalism. This position holds that each claim be taken on a case by case basis. Amongst the philosophical papers on the subject, particularism seems to be the consensus position. The third path, which is called the "Public Trust Approach" will be discussed in a future post.

The advantages of particularism address every weakness of the generalist position. First off, by addressing each theory on its own merits, it avoids the catastrophic weakness of dismissing legitimate theories of conspiracy. The importance of this advantage cannot be overstated. Most obviously it allows an individual to accept legitimate historical events as being conspiratorial without succumbing to the label of "conspiracy theory" while at the same dismissing other theories that are legitimate conspiracy theories. A person could reject a number of theories regarding globalist theories of Illuminati control over banks and the media while still accepting a collusion theory of financial regulators/banks/institutions prior to the collapse of the housing market in 2008. The latter is a matter of historical record while the former is not.

On a more tactical note it prevents an effective use of the fallacious tactic known as the "Gish gallop" wherein a Conspiracy theorist carpet bombs their opponent with a series of claims. If the skeptic tries to dismiss the entire thing they are likely to dismiss a legitimate theory and thus have poisoned their own well (this is a tactic that unfortunately has some success--a skeptic has to be nearly flawless in their dismissal but a conspiracy theorist can just put forth any claim). The drawback here is that it is intellectually exhausting. While the generalist position is great for "umbrella theories" the particularist position would get the individual bogged down in minutiae. E.G. the particularist may be compelled to begin a dismantling of every aspect of the flat earth theory (of which there are numerous) while the generalist could just dismiss the entire thing. Perhaps, this claim is too strong and that it is needless to regard every aspect of a theory.

That might be the case if we were to ignore the more academic theories, especially concerning those of the "CAM" (Complimentary and Alternative Medicine) theories. While generally we can assume that conspiracy theories revolving around CAM can be ignored, ala the Generalist position, not every aspect of this side of pseudoscience can be done so. For all the naturopathic "remedies" buttressed by the claims that "Western Medicine" and "Big Pharma" wants to suppress them, some natural herbs are efficacious (i.e. Willow Bark in remedying minor pain). Further such dismissal of pseudoscience would not give us the general knowledge that we have now, as Astronomy is a study borne out of Astrology just as Chemistry's immediate predecessor is Alchemy.

The second advantage is that it does force the type of rigor that we would expect out of proper investigation. Yes, as mentioned before, it can be exhausting but that ought not to be persuasively dismissive, quite the contrary the more difficult it is the more honest it would force us. Such rigorous attention to relevant details, is the most important thing any proper researcher ought to be involved in.

The third advantage is that prevents the stereotyping that associates itself with conspiracy theories and theorists. This is inextricably linked with the other two positions. The stereotyping allows us to (rightfully) dismiss the David Icke types, but most people who believe in one or two conspiracy theories are not that type. Most conspiracies are dismissed by the general public, but that public usually believes in some kind of conspiracy theory usually related to a historical event. Nearly half of Americans believe in some kind of conspiracy surrounding the assassination of JFK, this does not mean that we have to dismiss them as tinfoil wearing nuts. Neither do we have to dismiss a person's distrust of official government statements just because that distrust is born out of that conspiracy theory. This is simple well poisoning.

From a practical standpoint this also gives an opportunity for instruction. By engaging with a conspiracy theory we can find the "evidence" used, and begin asking pointed question for which debunking is the ultimate goal. As a side note: it's important to stress that to avoid the "double down effect" or "backlash effect" merely presenting counter evidence does not work. The blanket dismissal of the generalist will only lead to accusations of elitist snobbery which, for an academic, is already a hard mountain to climb over.

As far as our current debate is considered the particularist position's only drawback is that it is difficult and time consuming. It's worth pointing out that the defenders of the generalist position seem to solely occupy the social sciences who don't typically involve themselves with the theories themselves but rather concern meta issues concerning why people believe them and the effect of belief. Those holding the particularist debate, as of this writing, are on the philosophical side. This makes sense concerning that we (I'm a philosopher after all) concern ourselves with reasoning and counterfactuals as a profession. We'll consider the third position in the next post.

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