The Public Trust Approach
Now returning to the third view regarding Conspiracy theories, "The Public Trust Approach" (PTA). This theory takes some unpacking in that it is not specifically labelled as such by the author. It is also not laid out as a specific approach to dealing with conspiracy theories, however it is easily derived from Keeley's article "Of Conspiracy Theories. (Keeley '99)"
Any person writing about conspiracy theories in an academic fashion first must lay out the definition of what the term "conspiracy theory" actually means. What this means for our purpose is to see how his definition stacks up against mine. Keeley identifies five characteristics which separate CTs from other explanations. In fact he wants to make a clear distinction between what he calls Unwarranted Conspiracy Theories (UCT) and warranted theories of conspiracy which would be, at the very least, deserving of further investigation. This last category doesn't need a specific label since an evidenced theory of, say, a historical event would just be called "history" and not "warranted theory of events."
Keeley's first characteristic is that a UCT runs counter to official explanations (1). In this we are in agreement. There will be some kind of dispute over what counts as an official explanation but we can assume that in such UCTs concerning 9/11, JFK, Flat Earth, Hollow Earth, GMOs, we mean a consensus of experts on the subject. However, this is clearly not enough. This alone does not place Nixon's involvement in Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, or the controversy concerning thalidomide outside the realm of UCT. (1) needs further qualifications.
The true intention is invariably nefarious (2). This goes to motive, and as I bring up in my course, I've never run across a conspiracy theory where the motive was generally benevolent. Universally it is always to the boon of a small cadre of individuals. (1) along with (2) can arguably still make Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Thalidomide UCTs. In all three cases we have a select few benefitting from a conspiracy. I will concede however that keeping Iran-Contra on this list is probably debatable, but we want to be able to exclude it from the UCT label conclusively.
Ties together seemingly unrelated events (3). The qualification here is "dot-connecting," a form of post hoc reasoning where coincidence is eliminated and everything that happens surrounding an event is integral to the story of the event. For instance the owner of WTC complex was not in his office during the attacks so the 9/11 conspiracist uses that to prove that there was some kind of foreknowledge of the attack. In reality, the man just had a doctor's appointment. Our three qualifications together eliminate the thalidomide from being a UCT, as the facts supporting the idea that pressure was applied to the FDA and specifically to Dr. Frances Kelsey to approve the drug, are all documented. Claiming that it was a "Big Pharma" conspiracy is warranted, though it only applies to the company Richardson Merrell.
Truths are well guarded secrets (4). This one seems obvious-the truth of a conspiracy must be a secret or else it's not even part of the proper definition of "conspiracy." Still, we're keeping Watergate and Iran-Contra in the mix as it took persistent investigation in order to uncover it as well as special investigative commissions.
The chief tool is errant data (5). This category has two sub-headings (5a) is unaccounted for data. This includes facts regarding unrelated events. Any datum which is ignored as being irrelevant to the official story somehow builds the proof for the conspiracy. (5b) is contradictory data against the official story. To be clear 5b is errant not relevant data and whose importance is purely subjective. For example, the fact that a person opened an umbrella in front of JFK's motorcade is errant data, but to conspiracists it's relevant to the story (the person in question was protesting JFK's father's support for Neville Chamberlain and admitted in congressional testimony that he should win an award for doing the wrong thing in the wrong place at the wrong time). All five of these taken together push our last two historical events from being labelled UCTs. The proof of the Iran-Contra affair, while initially running counter to an official explanation has relevant data supporting the accusation that the government was involved just as Watergate does as well. By not building the explanation on errant data we can eliminate these two.
Now that we understand Keeley's definition we have to parse out the PTA. Keeley is firmly in the particularist camp, in that CTs are not generally dismissable. Again, we have to agree, the generalist camp seems to have a naïve trust of official public institutions, and would easily have to consider the initial denials of Watergate, Iran-Contra, and even Thalidomide as being UCTs. While a skeptic should wait for evidence before labelling all things as conspiracy it's also important to question official statements as well. I've said it many times before: being a skeptic is hard and this does not make it easier. Dismissing CTs that are without evidence or are prima facie implausible is a generally good position but particularism has the advantage of not accepting all official statements as truth.
PTA offers a middle ground which I would label as soft-particularism. The threshold here is that when a CT meets criterion (1) the consequence is what matters. The official explanation not only has to be wrong but a CT will often question the legitimacy of the body in question, up to and including an accusation of being "in on it" themselves. The 9/11 commission not only, in the eyes of the CT, failed to find the truth of the event but is part of the conspiracy itself. This leads the CT into violating the Sherlock Holmes principle of not changing the theory but of changing the facts so that the theory fits. Unless we are to adopt a post-modernist view where all truth is relative, there has to be some kind of foundation for what is accepted. Take anti-vaxxers, they want more investigations into vaccine safety, but every time the result comes in that vaccinations are generally safe they not only deny those results but then claim that investigation is a tool of those in charge of spreading X (X being autism in the US and sterility in Pakistan). Some kind of trust in institutions must be maintained, this is possible where some work needs to be done to establish what kind of trust would be reasonable. In the hard sciences we could probably rely on consensus as a positive indicator. With regard to political conspiracies it would have to be a negative threshold--whatever group or individual is denying established facts or trying to parse out definitions.
What the PTA allows us is a distinction between hard and soft particularism. Where HP would force us to consider all theories, even the most ridiculous ones--SP would allow dismissal of the most outlandish such as Flat Earth allowing at least a tentative trust of institutions like NASA or even basic geology.
Keeley, Brian; "Of Conspiracy Theories" The Journal of Philosophy March 1999 pp. 109-126
Any person writing about conspiracy theories in an academic fashion first must lay out the definition of what the term "conspiracy theory" actually means. What this means for our purpose is to see how his definition stacks up against mine. Keeley identifies five characteristics which separate CTs from other explanations. In fact he wants to make a clear distinction between what he calls Unwarranted Conspiracy Theories (UCT) and warranted theories of conspiracy which would be, at the very least, deserving of further investigation. This last category doesn't need a specific label since an evidenced theory of, say, a historical event would just be called "history" and not "warranted theory of events."
Keeley's first characteristic is that a UCT runs counter to official explanations (1). In this we are in agreement. There will be some kind of dispute over what counts as an official explanation but we can assume that in such UCTs concerning 9/11, JFK, Flat Earth, Hollow Earth, GMOs, we mean a consensus of experts on the subject. However, this is clearly not enough. This alone does not place Nixon's involvement in Watergate, the Iran-Contra affair, or the controversy concerning thalidomide outside the realm of UCT. (1) needs further qualifications.
The true intention is invariably nefarious (2). This goes to motive, and as I bring up in my course, I've never run across a conspiracy theory where the motive was generally benevolent. Universally it is always to the boon of a small cadre of individuals. (1) along with (2) can arguably still make Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Thalidomide UCTs. In all three cases we have a select few benefitting from a conspiracy. I will concede however that keeping Iran-Contra on this list is probably debatable, but we want to be able to exclude it from the UCT label conclusively.
Ties together seemingly unrelated events (3). The qualification here is "dot-connecting," a form of post hoc reasoning where coincidence is eliminated and everything that happens surrounding an event is integral to the story of the event. For instance the owner of WTC complex was not in his office during the attacks so the 9/11 conspiracist uses that to prove that there was some kind of foreknowledge of the attack. In reality, the man just had a doctor's appointment. Our three qualifications together eliminate the thalidomide from being a UCT, as the facts supporting the idea that pressure was applied to the FDA and specifically to Dr. Frances Kelsey to approve the drug, are all documented. Claiming that it was a "Big Pharma" conspiracy is warranted, though it only applies to the company Richardson Merrell.
Truths are well guarded secrets (4). This one seems obvious-the truth of a conspiracy must be a secret or else it's not even part of the proper definition of "conspiracy." Still, we're keeping Watergate and Iran-Contra in the mix as it took persistent investigation in order to uncover it as well as special investigative commissions.
The chief tool is errant data (5). This category has two sub-headings (5a) is unaccounted for data. This includes facts regarding unrelated events. Any datum which is ignored as being irrelevant to the official story somehow builds the proof for the conspiracy. (5b) is contradictory data against the official story. To be clear 5b is errant not relevant data and whose importance is purely subjective. For example, the fact that a person opened an umbrella in front of JFK's motorcade is errant data, but to conspiracists it's relevant to the story (the person in question was protesting JFK's father's support for Neville Chamberlain and admitted in congressional testimony that he should win an award for doing the wrong thing in the wrong place at the wrong time). All five of these taken together push our last two historical events from being labelled UCTs. The proof of the Iran-Contra affair, while initially running counter to an official explanation has relevant data supporting the accusation that the government was involved just as Watergate does as well. By not building the explanation on errant data we can eliminate these two.
Now that we understand Keeley's definition we have to parse out the PTA. Keeley is firmly in the particularist camp, in that CTs are not generally dismissable. Again, we have to agree, the generalist camp seems to have a naïve trust of official public institutions, and would easily have to consider the initial denials of Watergate, Iran-Contra, and even Thalidomide as being UCTs. While a skeptic should wait for evidence before labelling all things as conspiracy it's also important to question official statements as well. I've said it many times before: being a skeptic is hard and this does not make it easier. Dismissing CTs that are without evidence or are prima facie implausible is a generally good position but particularism has the advantage of not accepting all official statements as truth.
PTA offers a middle ground which I would label as soft-particularism. The threshold here is that when a CT meets criterion (1) the consequence is what matters. The official explanation not only has to be wrong but a CT will often question the legitimacy of the body in question, up to and including an accusation of being "in on it" themselves. The 9/11 commission not only, in the eyes of the CT, failed to find the truth of the event but is part of the conspiracy itself. This leads the CT into violating the Sherlock Holmes principle of not changing the theory but of changing the facts so that the theory fits. Unless we are to adopt a post-modernist view where all truth is relative, there has to be some kind of foundation for what is accepted. Take anti-vaxxers, they want more investigations into vaccine safety, but every time the result comes in that vaccinations are generally safe they not only deny those results but then claim that investigation is a tool of those in charge of spreading X (X being autism in the US and sterility in Pakistan). Some kind of trust in institutions must be maintained, this is possible where some work needs to be done to establish what kind of trust would be reasonable. In the hard sciences we could probably rely on consensus as a positive indicator. With regard to political conspiracies it would have to be a negative threshold--whatever group or individual is denying established facts or trying to parse out definitions.
What the PTA allows us is a distinction between hard and soft particularism. Where HP would force us to consider all theories, even the most ridiculous ones--SP would allow dismissal of the most outlandish such as Flat Earth allowing at least a tentative trust of institutions like NASA or even basic geology.
Keeley, Brian; "Of Conspiracy Theories" The Journal of Philosophy March 1999 pp. 109-126
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