Revisiting Demarcation
Drawing a line between a theory which is explained by the actions of a conspiracy and a "conspiracy theory" is a focus of this intermittently updated blog. The issue, in a nutshell, is when does an explanation transform from a "conspiracy theory" to "theory containing a conspiracy" of which the latter has at least the resemblance of plausibility (remember possibility for the purposes of this blog is defined in the logical manner, not the colloquial one).
So the standard test case for this position is the Watergate affair. Prior to the event called "the Saturday Night Massacre" anyone claiming that the Watergate break in had presidential approval or even knowledge could be dismissed as "merely a conspiracy theorist." For the most part that would be correct, the accusations were coming with little to no evidence and only a minor book by two obscure Washington Post reporters were even trying to make any kind of link.*
So we have event X, theory Y, and a truth value at time T. At T1 Y-->X = F while at T2 Y-->X=T.
The problem is that the available evidence doesn't mean anything with regard to the truth value of the theory in the objective world. The conspiracy theory regarding presidential involvement is true whether or not we have the evidence. Think of it with regard to the question of the existence of a god (because this actually makes it clearer for once). Is there a god? The answer is binary, either it is "yes" or it is "no" and that is always the answer no matter what we may personally believe the answer to be. So if I, as an atheist, don't believe in the truth of the assertion "there exists a singular being that fits with our definition of 'god'" that belief does not effect the truth value of the statement.
Now, one could retort that it makes a difference with regard to the truth value as it relates to me personally, but I'm not a post modernist and truth is not relative. That statement "god exists" is either true or false and it's always true or false, it does not depend on anything else other than the objective world.
However the issue of having a warranted belief in a theory then becomes salient. If I, as a fan of George McGovern and a person that hates Richard Nixon believe that he ordered the break in at the Watergate hotel simply because I hate Nixon, I don't have evidence for the assertion, I have a belief. One of the running themes of both this blog and the related class/dissertation I work on is that being skeptical is hard. Even if I want to believe that Nixon did it, prior to the evidence I have to suspend judgment or else what I am saying, while not false (because it is objectively true), it is unwarranted and I have no justification for claiming it's truth.
So where's the line?
Well that's a difficult concept. Which brings us to the demarcation problem. Some writers want to establish the line based on the kinds of theories that are being put forth. Keeley does this with his definition of "conspiracy theory" (Keeley 99) setting the tone for the later literature on the subject. The social sciences are rife with this problem as well, however their definitions are all set on the idea that CTs are always false, an issue that Dentith (basically everything he has written on the subject but let's just say Dentith '17) takes an issue with...and rightly so. However they aren't giving us a criteria to judge the truth value of the assertion as the particularist would have to commit to a case by case evidence standard.
What we need is a standard to determine whether or not the claim makes the "grand jury" standard of whether or not we ought to pursue further investigation. For that we turn to an obscure legal case: McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education (1255 E.D. Ark. 1982). The facts of the case are interesting as it represents a lawsuit against the state of Arkansas for passing a law mandating the teaching of "Creation Science" alongside Evolution. The Arkansas board of education lost the case as the judgment rendered claimed that Creation science was not science and merely a thinly disguised method of teaching religion in public institutions. The court made this judgment based on the testimony of Philosopher Michael Ruse and Paleontologist/Evolutionary Biologist Stephen Jay Gould. The criteria that the judge, Overton (we are now going to call this the Overton Standard), used was that in order to be scientific a claim must: 1) be guided by natural law, 2) be explained by reference to natural law, 3) be testable against the empirical world, 4) be tentative with regard to its conclusion, and 5) be falsifiable.
We are not restricting our analysis to scientific claims so we must make some adjustments. I would combine 1 and 2, applying Occam's razor. The more the claims rely on extra ordinary actors and agents the less likely it is. If the claim invokes unproven extra-natural agency we ought to dismiss it not as an evidence based explanation but as a faith based one. 3) is the evidence based requirement requiring no substantive change from our position. While we don't run experiments in historical and political conspiracy skepticism we can ask for some kind of documentation or other forms of evidence. 4 and 5 would remain unchanged as well. 5 has been dealt with in an earlier post and remains one of the better standards with which to question any kind of conspiracy claim. Though the only weakness with regard to it is that it depends more on the person making the assertion rather than the assertion itself. 4 is more difficult with historical claims, as a letter from a tape from Nixon claiming that he did it would make it pretty conclusive. That may need some more work as we continue on.
*Also it's important to point out that this entire thing was merely the result of Nixon's paranoia. It was the most useless break-in, Nixon won in such a landslide that it's mystifying why anyone would think he was in danger of losing that election.
So the standard test case for this position is the Watergate affair. Prior to the event called "the Saturday Night Massacre" anyone claiming that the Watergate break in had presidential approval or even knowledge could be dismissed as "merely a conspiracy theorist." For the most part that would be correct, the accusations were coming with little to no evidence and only a minor book by two obscure Washington Post reporters were even trying to make any kind of link.*
So we have event X, theory Y, and a truth value at time T. At T1 Y-->X = F while at T2 Y-->X=T.
The problem is that the available evidence doesn't mean anything with regard to the truth value of the theory in the objective world. The conspiracy theory regarding presidential involvement is true whether or not we have the evidence. Think of it with regard to the question of the existence of a god (because this actually makes it clearer for once). Is there a god? The answer is binary, either it is "yes" or it is "no" and that is always the answer no matter what we may personally believe the answer to be. So if I, as an atheist, don't believe in the truth of the assertion "there exists a singular being that fits with our definition of 'god'" that belief does not effect the truth value of the statement.
Now, one could retort that it makes a difference with regard to the truth value as it relates to me personally, but I'm not a post modernist and truth is not relative. That statement "god exists" is either true or false and it's always true or false, it does not depend on anything else other than the objective world.
However the issue of having a warranted belief in a theory then becomes salient. If I, as a fan of George McGovern and a person that hates Richard Nixon believe that he ordered the break in at the Watergate hotel simply because I hate Nixon, I don't have evidence for the assertion, I have a belief. One of the running themes of both this blog and the related class/dissertation I work on is that being skeptical is hard. Even if I want to believe that Nixon did it, prior to the evidence I have to suspend judgment or else what I am saying, while not false (because it is objectively true), it is unwarranted and I have no justification for claiming it's truth.
So where's the line?
Well that's a difficult concept. Which brings us to the demarcation problem. Some writers want to establish the line based on the kinds of theories that are being put forth. Keeley does this with his definition of "conspiracy theory" (Keeley 99) setting the tone for the later literature on the subject. The social sciences are rife with this problem as well, however their definitions are all set on the idea that CTs are always false, an issue that Dentith (basically everything he has written on the subject but let's just say Dentith '17) takes an issue with...and rightly so. However they aren't giving us a criteria to judge the truth value of the assertion as the particularist would have to commit to a case by case evidence standard.
What we need is a standard to determine whether or not the claim makes the "grand jury" standard of whether or not we ought to pursue further investigation. For that we turn to an obscure legal case: McClean v. Arkansas Board of Education (1255 E.D. Ark. 1982). The facts of the case are interesting as it represents a lawsuit against the state of Arkansas for passing a law mandating the teaching of "Creation Science" alongside Evolution. The Arkansas board of education lost the case as the judgment rendered claimed that Creation science was not science and merely a thinly disguised method of teaching religion in public institutions. The court made this judgment based on the testimony of Philosopher Michael Ruse and Paleontologist/Evolutionary Biologist Stephen Jay Gould. The criteria that the judge, Overton (we are now going to call this the Overton Standard), used was that in order to be scientific a claim must: 1) be guided by natural law, 2) be explained by reference to natural law, 3) be testable against the empirical world, 4) be tentative with regard to its conclusion, and 5) be falsifiable.
We are not restricting our analysis to scientific claims so we must make some adjustments. I would combine 1 and 2, applying Occam's razor. The more the claims rely on extra ordinary actors and agents the less likely it is. If the claim invokes unproven extra-natural agency we ought to dismiss it not as an evidence based explanation but as a faith based one. 3) is the evidence based requirement requiring no substantive change from our position. While we don't run experiments in historical and political conspiracy skepticism we can ask for some kind of documentation or other forms of evidence. 4 and 5 would remain unchanged as well. 5 has been dealt with in an earlier post and remains one of the better standards with which to question any kind of conspiracy claim. Though the only weakness with regard to it is that it depends more on the person making the assertion rather than the assertion itself. 4 is more difficult with historical claims, as a letter from a tape from Nixon claiming that he did it would make it pretty conclusive. That may need some more work as we continue on.
*Also it's important to point out that this entire thing was merely the result of Nixon's paranoia. It was the most useless break-in, Nixon won in such a landslide that it's mystifying why anyone would think he was in danger of losing that election.
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