Regarding Conspiracy Theories

Note: This is the introduction to my topical defense for my PhD dissertation. I've been working on a heavy rewrite which is why this blog has been updated so infrequently. I'll be posting sections and snippets of the topical defense. All comments are welcome.

We cannot be more painfully insulted then when someone takes the trouble to destroy the illusions in which our vanity has veiled itself.”—Adam Weishaupt (founder of the actual Illuminati), Diogenes’ Lamp (1804)



            We have all been exposed to conspiracy theories. Anyone who has spent more than a passing moment on the internet will no doubt have scrolled passed or perhaps even clicked on a story that purported to tell the real truth of some event, current or past. This was once not the case, but conspiracy theories and conspiracism (the belief in them) is now a regular occurrence. The internet made it everywhere, while in the early 90s conspiracy theories became a little more mainstream with Oliver Stone’s JFK and the Fox Network’s “The X-Files.” Prior to this, conspiracy theories were the domains of the ultra-fringe. Religious fundamentalists preaching doomsday scenarios, political extremists discussing world wide take overs by the UN, and/or anti-science causes arguing for an end to evidence based medicine in favor of “natural healing” or some “ancient secret.” Now, all of these things have their own webpages, social media accounts, and most importantly: they can seem legitimate.

            There has been sparse attention paid to conspiracy theories in the past. Notably, Karl Popper was the first to treat with the subject in his Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), while not mentioning the phenomenon specifically the type of thinking that he delves into is clearly our modern conspiracism. Afterward the next major work into the subject is an essay titled “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” by historian Richard Hofstadter in 1964 in Harper’s Magazine. Hofstadter’s work brings a critical eye to the importance and ubiquitous nature of conspiracism in the history of the United States triggered in part by the assassination of the president the year before. The essay was widely regarded and Harper’s itself called it one of the most important articles published in the magazine’s history. Subsequently conspiracism was regarded as the domain of the crank, the paranoid (as Hofstadter put it purposefully), and the crazy. Academics in general, philosophy in particular largely ignored the topic with only a few scant articles appearing every so often. In 1999 Brian Keeley publishes “Of Conspiracy Theories” in the Journal of Philosophy, followed by Lee Basham’s “Malevolent Global Conspiracy” in 2003. These two articles form the basis of modern philosophical examination of the topic. More contemporarily the topic has exploded in interest, spurred perhaps by the theories surrounding 9/11, the Iraq War, the presidency of Barack Obama, a persistent rejection of scientific/medical expertise, and a growing extremism in the United States (and Europe).

This topical defense will concern itself with the phenomenon of conspiracy theories. While tempting the purpose is not to provide a point for point rebuttal of various conspiracy theories themselves but to seek an understanding the concept from a philosophical point of view. Currently the topic is of public interest but conspiracy theories are not new and only now are we starting to understand their impact on a personal level as well as publicly.

            Section 1 will deal with the definition of the term “conspiracy theory.” This term has a dictionary definition that tracks with our intuitions on the subject, but is wholly inadequate when properly analyzed. The social sciences have built in truth values that regard conspiracy theories to be false, but as Dentith and others argue this seems only based on our stereotypes of conspiracy theories and theorists as lone nuts. This requires the creation of a neutral definition of a conspiracy theory, or is this an unreasonable bar to have to cross? Historical explanations that involve conspiracies are not labelled “conspiracy theories” because we have the evidence and argumentation which differentiates them from that term. Perhaps the bias built into the definitions offered by the social sciences is warranted.

Section 2 is a proposal on the demarcation line between when an alternative explanation crosses into conspiracism. There must exist a threshold wherein a proposed explanation for a phenomenon crosses from mere speculation toward a conspiracy theory. A person not understanding the intricacies of engineering mechanics may legitimately not understand how the buildings fell during the 9/11/01 attacks and that is much different than a person who has the knowledge and refuses to apply it. Similarly this works in the opposite direction, an individual that held presidential involvement with the Watergate break in, could legitimately be considered a conspiracy theorist until a certain point when a certain piece of evidence was revealed that definitively made the link—the difference being when the individual knew about that evidence or merely wished that it existed.

Section 3 is an attempt at rudimentary taxonomic classification of the kinds of the conspiracy theories. Not all theories are equal. Some are vast spanning conspiracies that subvert the very notions of reality while others are merely alternate views of historical events. Our intuition is that while they are both conspiracy theories a vast difference between the person that claims the Titanic was sunk on purpose and the person that claims that world is actually flat and there is no such thing as gravity.

Section 4 concerns our treatment of conspiracy theories with regard to engagement. While a widespread stereotype, not all conspiracy theorists are “tin-foil hat wearing basement dwellers” lacking rationality. This leads us to the path of generalism, which is taken by the social sciences, recommending that we reject any theory which can be reasonably said to fit in with our definition of “conspiracy theory.” The alternative is that of particularism which treats any explanation as being worthwhile for consideration. However, this position is not without its own issues, but has the advantage of negating stereotypes which may lead to the rejection of theories which may be supported by the evidence while also retaining a respect for the individual. Both positions will be evaluated and a combination of the two will be offered as a solution.