Cutting
The comments are back on the first chapter of the dissertation. Most of them are good, a few them are frustrating in that I ever made the mistakes in the first place. For instance, I was told that my punctuation was terrible. That's probably because the most consistent writing that I have been doing in the last decade or so, has been blogging. I typically don't worry about punctuation when I'm doing it, but, I should. The most troubling thing is that I have to cut and entire section that I rather liked. I have to cut it because the academic world has largely disagreed with the position being taken. The position is not with specific regard to my focus on conspiracy theories. It is however the foundation for a position on conspiracy theories that a different person takes. So this leaves me with two options: either cut it, or spend thirty pages trying to resurrect a dead horse.
The first, obviously appeals to my laziness. Cutting it means that it's gone and I never have to worry about it again. However, it doesn't appeal to the sunken cost problem. I already spent a lot of time writing the short section. I spent a greater amount of time researching it, and now that it's gone it feels like all of that time is wasted. Thus the second option not only provides a way to keep it but also a full chapter on its own to justify it...which would be completely out of sync with the rest of the work. Basically I have to cut it. The problem in short is that Imre Lakatos is largely unaccepted by the larger philosophical community with his definition of Progressive/regressive research programmes. His point is interesting, but in application to my larger topic it may just be irrelevant as evidence doesn't matter to conspiracy theorists when it contradicts their position. Basically, I have to cut, and it's fine. I'll just share it here so that I can still claim I wrote something that was used. Regardless that it's only seen between 8-20 people.
The context is that I am attempting to make a robust definition of conspiracy theory which separates the real conspiracies with their unsupported counterparts.
"
Another essential feature for the definition is that, while they are not necessarily false, they do have an inability to make any kind of prediction or anticipate new knowledge. This qualification is derived from Lakatos’ work via Clarke (Clarke 2002). The primary claim is that the difference between good theorizing and bad theorizing is that the former are progressive research programs. They make assumptions that are built around a central core idea. These assumptions will hold true if the core idea is verified, and it will also be able to anticipate new information as well as have some predictive value. The converse of this: the central core is weak, the initial assumptions do not bear out on the data, and that the theory has no predictive value define the regressive research programs that will eventually die on their own. Conspiracy theories are firmly entrenched in the regressive classification. Their core assumption seems to be that of the cover-up, with the evidence in question as the initial assumptions. Usually this evidence meets one or both of Keeley’s criteria. It should be noted that conspiracy theories require a lot of research so labelling them as “research programs” (whether progressive or regressive) shouldn’t seem out of place. Clarke’s contribution here further allows us to separate historical/scientific explanations from their conspiracy theory counterparts. Verified theories can assimilate new data into their initial assumptions. Even historical explanations are able to accomplish this. The core assumption of theories that the Watergate Break-In was that it was not a random break-in but had official sanction. The case is notable for this purpose in that we have a real time reveal of knowledge through the investigation conducted by the Washington Post. As new information regarding slush fund accounts and links from between the individual burglars and various government agencies the core assumption became stronger. Whereas conspiracy theories lack this ability. As previously stated, their core is based on a cover-up of an event or phenomenon. The initial assumptions are the facts specific to what the conspiracy theory is about. For instance, conspiracy theories surrounding mass shootings as false flag operations[1] begin with the assumption that there is a coverup of the real event. The belt contains assumptions that the shooting either didn’t happen and is a completely staged event or that the shooting was committed by an individual or individuals hired by the US government.[2] Usually the motive has something to do with the suspension of rights and the seizure of guns. In contrast to the Watergate example this theory is unable to assume any new information and it fails on its initial prediction that gun rights are going to be suspended as a direct result of the shooting itself.
Conspiracy theories are placed in rough bind here. Either they can admit to their regressive nature and become irrelevant or they can adjust their claims. The latter is problematic as constantly shifting theories fail to appeal to audiences other than those who are already conspiracy theorists. This usually causes the theories to get more general with their terms so that even those that concentrate on specific events begin to use nebulous terms that, while not pushing the theories into progressive territory, at least stem their regression. Conspiracy theories that attribute world events to secret cabals will use the term “Globalist” because it has no specific meaning (though it is often used as a code word for “Jews” in anti-Semitic theories that don’t wish to be obvious about the anti-Semitism). Likewise, for alternative medicine claims that use the word “toxin.” In scientific literature, the word has a specific meaning, but in the Complimentary and Alternative medicine world it is so loosely defined that it can refer to anything. The use of such terms is purposeful because it makes the theory harder to argue against, after all there is no alibi for “they” if it is difficult to establish who “they” are. The wider the scope of the theory the more this feature becomes a defining feature (Clarke 2002). The more specific theories become the more they expose themselves to criticism from two sides: the first being skeptics and debunkers who can attack hard claims. They can ask questions as to membership in secret societies, why a historical event was faked, or why X is being suppressed as a cancer cure. The second side are those with competing conspiracy theories, who will seize upon the same specificity in order to replace it with their own theories. Lest we think this as a more amusing feature of conspiracism the arguments can get quite intense, Flat Earth theory has a schism between those that adhere to the postulation that the Earth is under a dome and those that believe the disc shaped earth is accelerating through the infinite space at a rate which accounts for the force of gravity. Specific claims can also make the same theory contradict itself as it does in Oliver Stone’s JFK, where the assassination is both placed on a group of closeted homosexuals taking revenge on behalf of the CIA for the Bay of Pigs debacle but then later on Vice President Lyndon Johnson and the military in order to escalate the war in Vietnam. Belief in contradictory claims though isn’t unusual, even within the same theory (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton 2012), though it does make it difficult to understand how it happens. Ultimately though the issue is balance. Clarke is correct that conspiracy theories need to have some level of specificity in order to be considered beyond anything a mere “guess.”
I am going to save a portion of this mostly the indictment of the acceptance of contradictory information, the use of purposefully vague terminology, and the infighting amongst people who allegedly agree with the conspiracy theory.
The first, obviously appeals to my laziness. Cutting it means that it's gone and I never have to worry about it again. However, it doesn't appeal to the sunken cost problem. I already spent a lot of time writing the short section. I spent a greater amount of time researching it, and now that it's gone it feels like all of that time is wasted. Thus the second option not only provides a way to keep it but also a full chapter on its own to justify it...which would be completely out of sync with the rest of the work. Basically I have to cut it. The problem in short is that Imre Lakatos is largely unaccepted by the larger philosophical community with his definition of Progressive/regressive research programmes. His point is interesting, but in application to my larger topic it may just be irrelevant as evidence doesn't matter to conspiracy theorists when it contradicts their position. Basically, I have to cut, and it's fine. I'll just share it here so that I can still claim I wrote something that was used. Regardless that it's only seen between 8-20 people.
The context is that I am attempting to make a robust definition of conspiracy theory which separates the real conspiracies with their unsupported counterparts.
"
Another essential feature for the definition is that, while they are not necessarily false, they do have an inability to make any kind of prediction or anticipate new knowledge. This qualification is derived from Lakatos’ work via Clarke (Clarke 2002). The primary claim is that the difference between good theorizing and bad theorizing is that the former are progressive research programs. They make assumptions that are built around a central core idea. These assumptions will hold true if the core idea is verified, and it will also be able to anticipate new information as well as have some predictive value. The converse of this: the central core is weak, the initial assumptions do not bear out on the data, and that the theory has no predictive value define the regressive research programs that will eventually die on their own. Conspiracy theories are firmly entrenched in the regressive classification. Their core assumption seems to be that of the cover-up, with the evidence in question as the initial assumptions. Usually this evidence meets one or both of Keeley’s criteria. It should be noted that conspiracy theories require a lot of research so labelling them as “research programs” (whether progressive or regressive) shouldn’t seem out of place. Clarke’s contribution here further allows us to separate historical/scientific explanations from their conspiracy theory counterparts. Verified theories can assimilate new data into their initial assumptions. Even historical explanations are able to accomplish this. The core assumption of theories that the Watergate Break-In was that it was not a random break-in but had official sanction. The case is notable for this purpose in that we have a real time reveal of knowledge through the investigation conducted by the Washington Post. As new information regarding slush fund accounts and links from between the individual burglars and various government agencies the core assumption became stronger. Whereas conspiracy theories lack this ability. As previously stated, their core is based on a cover-up of an event or phenomenon. The initial assumptions are the facts specific to what the conspiracy theory is about. For instance, conspiracy theories surrounding mass shootings as false flag operations[1] begin with the assumption that there is a coverup of the real event. The belt contains assumptions that the shooting either didn’t happen and is a completely staged event or that the shooting was committed by an individual or individuals hired by the US government.[2] Usually the motive has something to do with the suspension of rights and the seizure of guns. In contrast to the Watergate example this theory is unable to assume any new information and it fails on its initial prediction that gun rights are going to be suspended as a direct result of the shooting itself.
Conspiracy theories are placed in rough bind here. Either they can admit to their regressive nature and become irrelevant or they can adjust their claims. The latter is problematic as constantly shifting theories fail to appeal to audiences other than those who are already conspiracy theorists. This usually causes the theories to get more general with their terms so that even those that concentrate on specific events begin to use nebulous terms that, while not pushing the theories into progressive territory, at least stem their regression. Conspiracy theories that attribute world events to secret cabals will use the term “Globalist” because it has no specific meaning (though it is often used as a code word for “Jews” in anti-Semitic theories that don’t wish to be obvious about the anti-Semitism). Likewise, for alternative medicine claims that use the word “toxin.” In scientific literature, the word has a specific meaning, but in the Complimentary and Alternative medicine world it is so loosely defined that it can refer to anything. The use of such terms is purposeful because it makes the theory harder to argue against, after all there is no alibi for “they” if it is difficult to establish who “they” are. The wider the scope of the theory the more this feature becomes a defining feature (Clarke 2002). The more specific theories become the more they expose themselves to criticism from two sides: the first being skeptics and debunkers who can attack hard claims. They can ask questions as to membership in secret societies, why a historical event was faked, or why X is being suppressed as a cancer cure. The second side are those with competing conspiracy theories, who will seize upon the same specificity in order to replace it with their own theories. Lest we think this as a more amusing feature of conspiracism the arguments can get quite intense, Flat Earth theory has a schism between those that adhere to the postulation that the Earth is under a dome and those that believe the disc shaped earth is accelerating through the infinite space at a rate which accounts for the force of gravity. Specific claims can also make the same theory contradict itself as it does in Oliver Stone’s JFK, where the assassination is both placed on a group of closeted homosexuals taking revenge on behalf of the CIA for the Bay of Pigs debacle but then later on Vice President Lyndon Johnson and the military in order to escalate the war in Vietnam. Belief in contradictory claims though isn’t unusual, even within the same theory (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton 2012), though it does make it difficult to understand how it happens. Ultimately though the issue is balance. Clarke is correct that conspiracy theories need to have some level of specificity in order to be considered beyond anything a mere “guess.”
I am going to save a portion of this mostly the indictment of the acceptance of contradictory information, the use of purposefully vague terminology, and the infighting amongst people who allegedly agree with the conspiracy theory.
[1] A
false flag operation is an attack in which the perpetrator has disguised
themselves as someone/something else. Originally it referred to privateers or
pirates that disguised their ships as those of other countries by literally
posting a false flag on their mast. In conspiratorial terms false flag attacks
are not different in essence, but they typically involve a government staging
an attack to get justification for starting a war or suspending human rights. There
is historical evidence that such attacks have been conducted, though I will
emphasize that these are almost always in dispute by scholars. The least
disputed is the “Mukden Incident” in which the Japanese army attempted to
sabotage their own railroad. The bombing had little effect but was used as a
pretext for the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. There is little dispute that the
Japanese army conducted the attack itself, there is dispute as to how high up
the chain of command it was sanctioned.
[2]
Given that mass shootings happen with a frequency unmatched by the rest of the
world it doesn’t seem necessary to portray this type of conspiracy theory
neutral as to nationality.
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